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THE HARMFUL SIDE EFFECTS OF DRUG PROHIBITION
Randy E. Barnett*
I. INTRODUCTION: CURING THE DRUG LAW ADDICTION
Some drugs make people feel good. That is why some people use them. Some
of these drugs are alleged to have side effects so destructive that many advise
against their use. The same may be said about statutes that attempt to prohibit the
manufacture, sale, and use of drugs. Advocating drug prohibition makes some
people feel good because they think they are “doing something” about what they
believe to be a serious social problem. Others who support these laws are not so
altruistically motivated. Employees of law enforcement bureaus and academics
who receive government grants to study drug use, for example, may gain
financially from drug prohibition. But as with using drugs, using drug laws can
have moral and practical side effects so destructive that they argue against ever
using legal institutions in this manner.
One might even say—and not altogether metaphorically—that some people
become psychologically or economically addicted to drug laws.1 That is, some
people continue to support these statutes despite the massive and unavoidable ill

*

© 2009 Randy E. Barnett, Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory,
Georgetown University Law Center. Permission to copy for classroom use is hereby
granted. This article revises and updates Randy E. Barnett, Curing the Drug Law
Addiction: The Harmful Side-Effects of Legal Prohibition, in DEALING WITH DRUGS
(Ronald Hamowy ed., 1987). My thanks to Professor Erik Luna for his interest in seeing
that this article receive a wider audience and to the editors of the Utah Law Review for
helping to update it.
1
For those who would object to my use of the word addiction here because drug laws
cause no physiological dependence, it should be pointed out that, for example, the Illinois
statute specifying the criteria to be used to pass upon the legality of a drug nowhere
requires that a drug be physiologically addictive. The tendency to induce physiological
dependence is just one factor to be used to assess the legality of a drug. Drugs with an
accepted medical use may be controlled if they have a potential for abuse, and abuse will
lead to “psychological or physiological dependence.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/205 (2006)
(emphasis added); see also id. §§ 570/207, 570/209, 570/211. Thus, applying the same
standard to drug-law users as they apply to drug users permits us to characterize them as
addicts if they are psychologically “dependent” on such laws. Personally, I would favor
limiting the use of the term addiction to physiological dependence. As John Kaplan put the
matter, “while the concept of addiction is relatively specific and subject to careful
definition, the concept of psychological dependence, or habituation, often merely reflects
the common sense observation that people who like a drug will continue to use it if they
can—so long as they continue to like it: effects.” JOHN KAPLAN, MARIJUANA: THE NEW
PROHIBITION 160 (1970). The same might be said about those who like drug laws.
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effects that result.2 The psychologically addicted ignore these harms so that they
can attain the “good”—their “high”—they perceive that drug laws produce. Other
drug-law users ignore the costs of prohibition because of their “economic”
dependence on drug laws; these people profit financially from drug laws and are
unwilling to undergo the economic “withdrawal” that would be caused by their
repeal. 3
Both kinds of drug-law addicts may deny their addiction by asserting that the
side effects are not really so terrible or that they can be kept “under control.” The
economically dependent drug-law users may also deny their addiction by asserting
that (1) noble motivations, rather than economic gain, lead them to support these
statutes; (2) they are not unwilling to withstand the painful financial readjustment
that ending prohibition would force them to undergo; and (3) they can “quit” their
support any time they want to—provided, of course, that they are rationally
convinced of its wrongness.
Their denials notwithstanding, both kinds of addicts are detectable by their
adamant resistance to rational persuasion. While they eagerly await and devour any
new evidence of the destructiveness of drug use, they are almost completely
uninterested in any practical or theoretical knowledge of the ill effects of
illegalizing such conduct.4 Yet in a free society governed by democratic principles,
these addicts cannot be compelled to give up their desire to control the
consumption patterns of others. Nor can they be forced to support legalization in
spite of their desires. In a democratic system, they may voice and vote their
opinions about such matters no matter how destructive the consequences of their
desires are to themselves or, more importantly, to others. Only rational persuasion
may be employed to wean them from this habit. As part of this process of
persuasion, drug-law addicts must be exposed to the destruction their addiction
wreaks on drug users, law enforcement, and on the general public. They must be
made to understand the inherent limits of using law to accomplish social
objectives.
This Article will not attempt to identify and “weigh” the costs of drug use
against the costs of drug laws. Instead, it will focus exclusively on identifying the
harmful side effects of drug law enforcement and showing why these effects are
unavoidable. So one-sided a treatment is justified for two reasons. First, a cost-

2

See David C. Leven, Our Drug Laws Have Failed–So Where Is the Desperately
Needed Meaningful Reform?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, 305–06 (2000) (stating that
many people still support the current drug laws).
3
See David R. Henderson, A Humane Economist’s Case For Drug Legalization, 24
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 655, 662 (1991) (noting that some scholars argue that illegality is more
profitable).
4
See James Ostrowski, The Moral & Practical Case for Drug Legalization, 18
HOFSTRA L.REV. 607, 647–50 (1990) (many proponents of drug laws mischaracterize their
effects to gain support).
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benefit or cost-cost analysis may simply be impossible.5 Second, discussions by
persons who support illegalizing drugs usually emphasize only the harmful effects
of drug use while largely ignoring the serious costs of such policies. By
exclusively relating the other side of the story, this Article is intended to inject
some balance into the normal debate.
The harmful side-effects of drug laws have long been noted by a number of
commentators, although among the general public the facts are not as well known
as they should be.6 More importantly, even people who agree about the facts fail to
grasp that it is the nature of the means—coercion—chosen to pursue the
suppression of voluntary consumptive activity that makes these effects
unavoidable. This vital and overlooked connection is the main subject of this
Article.
II. CLARIFYING OUR TERMS
The inherently destructive effects of drug laws, results from the combination
of two aspects of drug prohibition that need to be distinguished. The first is the
coercive nature of the means being used. The second is the type of conduct being
coerced. Only by understanding the kind of conduct that is the subject of drug laws
and how it differs from other kinds of conduct regulated by law can we begin to
see why legal coercion is an inappropriate means in which to pursue our
objectives.
Drug laws reflect the decision of some persons that other persons who wish to
consume certain substances should not be permitted to act on their preferences.
Nor should anyone be permitted to satisfy the desires of drug consumers by
making and selling the prohibited drug. For the purposes of this discussion, the
most important characteristic of the legal approach to drug use is that these
consumptive and commercial activities are being regulated by force.7 Drug-law
5

See Randy E. Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Society: Part One–Power vs.
Liberty, 4 CRIM.L JUST. ETHICS 50, 63–65 (1985) (discussing some of the problems with
efforts at cost benefit calculation).
6
While there certainly is no consensus on the conclusions that ought to be drawn
from the facts of this tragic story, the facts themselves are not unknown in law enforcement
or in academia. See, e.g., ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, LAWS AGAINST MARIJUANA: THE PRICE
WE PAY 16 (1975) (describing the costs and benefits of drug laws); JOHN KAPLAN, THE
HARDEST DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY 94–100 (1983) (noting the problems that
would be remedied by free availability); Glenn Garvin et al., Heroin: Should it be Legal—
Advocates are few but Persuasive, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1984, at A1; Alan L. Otten,
Dealing With Drugs–The Drug Trade: Experts in the Field of Narcotics Debate Ways to
Curb Abuse–One Side Touts Legalization, Other Wants Crackdown; Probably Neither Is
Right–Corporate Attitudes Change, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1984, at 1; Megan Cox, Dealing
With Drugs–The Drug Trade: Abuse of Narcotics in US is by No Means A Recent
Phenomenon––In the 1800s Doctors’ Praise of Opium and Morphine Caused Much
Addiction–Cocaine for the Common Cold, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1984, at 1.
7
While force is a neglected element of a proper moral evaluation of law, it may not
be a necessary characteristic of law. Some institutions that may be characterized as
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users wish to decide what substances others may consume and sell, and they want
their decision to be imposed on others by force. The forcible aspect of the legal
approach to drug use is one of two factors that combine to create the serious side
effects of drug-law use. The other contributing factor is the nature of the conduct
that drug laws attempt to prohibit.
No one claims that the conduct sought to be prohibited is of a sort that, if
properly conducted, inevitably causes death or even great bodily harm.8 Smoking
tobacco is bad for your health. It may shorten your life considerably. But it does
not immediately or invariably kill you. The same is true of smoking marijuana.9 Of
course, prohibited drugs can be improperly administered and cause great harm
indeed, but even aspirin can be harmful in certain cases. Further, the conduct that
drug laws prohibit is not inevitably addicting.10 Some users become
psychologically or physically dependent on prohibited substances. Others do not.11
genuinely legal in nature may do their work without using force. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAW 108–10 (1965). What is important here is that the particular kind
of law advocated by drug control enthusiasts is that kind that does involve the use of force.
Therefore, in this chapter I will be using the term “law” in this limited sense, and although
I will not repeatedly qualify this use in the manner suggested by Fuller’s analysis, such a
limited use is intended and should be implied. See Dale A. Nance, Legal Theory and the
Pivotal Role of the Concept of Coercion, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1985) (discussing the
role of coercion in legal theory).
8
Like the federal government, the State of Illinois classifies or “schedules” controlled
substances according to their varying characteristics from most serious (Schedule I) to least
serious (Schedule V). That drugs can cause death or great bodily harm is not a requirement
for prohibition. For drugs under schedules 11-V, potential for causing death or great bodily
harm is not even a factor to be considered in determining the classification of a controlled
substance. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 570/201–212 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).
Schedule I drugs are those drugs that have a “high potential for abuse” and have “no
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States or lack[] accepted safety
for use in treatment under medical supervision.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 570/203
(emphasis added). In other words, if a drug has no accepted medical use in treatment in the
United States, all that is required for it to be scheduled is that it have a “high potential for
abuse.” Id.
9
In discussing the effects of marijuana, the legislative declaration of the Cannabis
Control Act of the State of Illinois states only that “the current state of scientific and
medical knowledge concerning the effects of cannabis makes it necessary to acknowledge
the physical, psychological and sociological damage which is incumbent upon its use.” 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 550/1. But see, e.g., Munir A. Khan, Assad Abbas, and Knud
Jensen, Cannabis Usage in Pakistan: A Pilot Study of Long Term Effects on Social Status
and Physical Health, in CANNABIS AND CULTURE 349–50 (Vera Rubin, ed., 1975) (“The
most significant point which emerged was that in a society such as Pakistan where cannabis
consumption is socially accepted, habituation does not lead to any undesirable results. . . .
Our study appears to show that cannabis does not produce any serious long-term effects.”).
10
“[C]ultural and social factors . . . in combination with the individual’s somatic and
psychic characteristics, determine the pattern of his drug behavior once he has chosen to
experiment with it. The majority of individuals who reach this point progress no further
and often discontinue marihuana use.” NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIJUANA AND DRUG
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What then characterizes the conduct being prohibited by statutes illegalizing
drugs? It is conduct where persons either introduce certain intoxicating substances
into their own bodies, or manufacture or sell these substances to those who wish to
use them.12 The prime motivation for the drug user’s behavior is to alter his state of
mind to get “high.”13 The harmful effects of the substances are not normally the
effects being sought by the user; thus they are usually termed “side effects.” People
could introduce all sorts of harmful substances into their bodies, but do not
generally do so unless they think that it will have a mind-altering effect. Anyone
who wishes to ingest substances to cause death or great bodily harm will always
have a vast array of choices available to him at the corner hardware store. A
widespread black market in poisons has not developed to meet any such demand.
One can speculate about the underlying psyche of those who would engage in
such risky behavior. One can argue that such persons must be “self-destructive”—
that is, out to harm themselves in some way. It is doubtful, however, that such
generalizations are any truer for drug users than they are for alcohol users or
cigarette smokers, for whom the adverse health effects may be both more likely
and more severe than those of many prohibited substances,14 or for skydivers,
ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING 44 (1972); see also PRESIDENT’S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 13 (1967) (“Physical dependence does not
develop”); Khan, Abbas, and Jensen, supra note 9, at 349 (“We have deliberately used the
word habituation rather than addiction because we did not find either increased tolerance or
withdrawal symptomatology, which are the essential prerequisites for addiction”); Kaplan,
supra note 1, at 157–69 (arguing that there is little evidence to prove marijuana causes a
physical dependence).
The Illinois statute prohibiting certain substances exemplifies the fact that drug laws
are not aimed exclusively at addictive drugs. The criteria of Schedule I drugs, quoted supra
note 8, requires only that the substance have a high potential for abuse. The other schedules
make it clear that “abuse” is not the same as potential for “psychological or physiological
dependence,” by consistently listing them as separate factors that must be found before a
drug that does have a legitimate medical usage in the United States may be legally
controlled. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 570/201–212 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).
11
For a summary of research on the pharmacology of opiates and their effects on the
street user, see KAPLAN, supra note 6, 5–22.
12
See supra note 8.
13
One objection to the definition offered in the text for the subject of drug laws is that
it would apply to alcohol and caffeine consumption and for this reason must miss some
special purpose of drug laws. On the contrary, the manufacture and sale of alcohol were
once made illegal for similar reasons. Only the disastrous consequences that resulted from
alcohol prohibition and the social acceptability of both alcohol and coffee have kept both
substances legal to date. Moreover, at least with alcohol, regulation and even prohibition is
constantly being advocated by some and implemented in certain locales.
14
See John C. Ball & John Chapman Urbaitis, Absence of Major Medical
Complications Among Chronic Opiate Addicts, in THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF OPIATE
ADDICTION IN THE UNITED STATES 301, 304–06 (1970); World Health Org. Special
Comm., Problems Related to Alcohol Consumption: The Changing Situation, 9 CONTEMP.
DRUG PROBS. 185, 194–98 (1980). Since the much heralded appearance of the U.S. DEP’T
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skiers, or bicyclers on city streets—not to mention the millions of people who
refuse to wear their seat belts.
We can conclude then that the end or purpose of drug laws is to discourage
people from engaging in risky activity in which they wish to engage either because
they desire the intoxicating effects they associate with the consumption of a drug
or because they desire the profit that can be realized by supplying intoxicating
drugs to others.15 The means that drug laws employ to accomplish this end is using
force against those who would engage in such activities, either to prevent them
from doing so or to punish those who nonetheless succeed in doing so.
With this understanding of means and ends, I now explain why using force
against people who wish to use intoxicants inevitably harms them, harms the
general public, and harms the legal system.
III. THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF DRUG LAWS ON DRUG USERS
At least part16 of the motivation for drug prohibition is that drug use is thought
to harm those who engage in it.17 A perceived benefit of drug prohibition is that
fewer people will engage in self-harming conduct than would in the absence of
prohibition.18 While the contention that drug use can be harmful will not be

OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE
SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE PUB. NO. 1103 (Jan. 11, 1964), the adverse health effects of tobacco

smoking have been much studied and are quite well known.
15
See infra notes 19–21 and accompanying text (discussing the typical policy
rationales used to justify drug laws that prohibited perceived self-harming conduct).
16
The other important motivation for drug prohibition is the perceived effects of drug
use on the rest of society. See infra note 18 (Illinois legislature declaring its belief that drug
consumption creates “consequences upon every element of society”). For a discussion on
the countervailing costs imposed on society by drug laws will also be discussed, see infra
Section IV.
17
In its legislative declaration, the legislature of the State of Illinois expressed this
typical sentiment:
The abuse and misuse of alcohol and other drugs constitutes a serious public
health problem the effects of which on public safety and the criminal justice
system cause serious social and economic losses, as well as great human
suffering. It is imperative that a comprehensive and coordinated strategy be
developed . . . to empower individuals and communities through local
prevention efforts and to provide intervention, treatment, rehabilitation and other
services to those who misuse alcohol or other drugs (and, when appropriate, the
families of those persons) to lead healthy and drug-free lives and become
productive citizens in the community.
20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 301/1-5 (2009).
18
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/100 (1998) (“It is the intent of the General
Assembly, recognizing the rising incidence in the abuse of drugs and other dangerous
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disputed here, there is another dimension of the issue of harm to drug users that
may seem obvious to most when pointed out, but nonetheless is generally ignored
in policy discussions of drug prohibition. Much of the harms associated with drug
use is caused not by intoxicating drugs, but by the fact that such drugs are illegal.
A. Drug Laws Punish Users
The most obvious harm to drug users caused by drug laws is the legal and
physical jeopardy in which they are placed. Imprisonment must generally be
considered a harm to the person imprisoned or it would hardly be an effective
deterrent.19 To deter certain conduct it is advocated that we punish—in the sense of
forcibly inflict unpleasantness upon—those who engage in this conduct.20 In so
doing it is hoped that people will be discouraged from engaging in the prohibited
conduct.
But what about those who are not discouraged and who engage in such
conduct anyway? Does the practice of punishing these persons make life better or
worse for them? The answer is clear. As harmful as using drugs may be to
someone, being imprisoned often makes matters much worse.
Normally when considering matters of legality, we are not concerned about
whether a law punishes a lawbreaker and makes him worse off. Indeed, normally
such punishment is deliberately imposed on the lawbreaker to protect someone else
who we consider to be completely innocent—like the victim, or potential victim, of
a rape, robbery, or murder.21 We are therefore quite willing to harm the lawbreaker
to protect the innocent. In other words, the objects of these laws are the victims;
the subjects of these laws are the criminal.
substances and its resultant damage to the peace, health, and welfare of the citizens of
Illinois, to provide a system of control over the distribution and use of controlled
substances which will more effectively: . . . (2) deter the unlawful and destructive abuse of
controlled substances; (3) penalize most heavily the illicit traffickers and profiteers of
controlled substances, who propagate and perpetuate the abuse of such substances with
reckless disregard for its consumptive consequences upon every element of society.”).
19
Imagine if we told people that if we caught them using drugs, we would send them
to the Riviera for a few years, all expenses paid.
20
See Stanley I. Benn, Punishment, in 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 29, 29
(Paul Edwards ed., Reprint ed. 1972) (“Characteristically, punishment is unpleasant. It is
inflicted on an offender because of an offense he has committed; it is deliberately imposed,
not just the natural consequence of a person’s action (like a hang-over), and the
unpleasantness is essential to it, not an accidental accompaniment to some other treatment
(like the pain of a dentist’s drill).”).
21
Punishment is also favored on the grounds that the lawbreaker deserves to be
punished. See, e.g., John Hospers, Retribution: The Ethics of Punishment, in ASSESSING
THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 181, 181–209
(Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977) (discussing criminal punishment under the
retributive theory). But see Walter Kaufmann, Retribution and the Ethics of Punishment, in
ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 211,
211–30 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977).
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Drug laws are different in this respect from many other criminal laws. With
drug prohibition we are supposed to be concerned with the well-being of
prospective drug users. So the object of drug laws—the persons whom drug laws
are supposed to “protect”—are often the same persons who are the subject of drug
laws. Whenever the object of a law is also its subject, however, a problem arises.
The means chosen for benefiting prospective drug users seriously harms those who
still use drugs and does so in ways that drugs alone cannot: by punishing drug
users over and above the harmful effects of drug use. But the harm done by drug
prohibition to drug users goes beyond the direct effects of punishment.
B. Drug Laws Raise the Price of Drugs to Users
Illegalization makes the prices of drugs rise.22 By increasing scarcity, all else
being equal, the confiscation and destruction of drugs causes the price of the
prohibited good to rise. And by increasing the risk to those who manufacture and
sell, drug laws raise the cost of production and distribution, necessitating higher
prices that reflect a “risk premium.”23 Like the threat of punishment, higher prices
may very well discourage some from using drugs who would otherwise do so. This
is, in fact, a principal rationale for interdiction policies.24 But higher prices take
their toll on those who are not deterred, and these adverse effects are rarely
emphasized in discussions of drug laws.
Higher prices require higher income by users. If users cannot earn enough by
legal means to pay higher prices, then they may be induced to engage in illegal
conduct—theft, burglary, robbery—in which they would not otherwise engage.25
The increased harm caused to the victims of these crimes will be discussed below
as a cost inflicted by drug laws on the general public. Relevant here is the adverse
effect drug laws have on the life of drug users. By raising the costs of drugs, drug
laws breed criminality.26 They induce some drug users who would not otherwise
22

Morgan Cloud, Cocaine, Demand, and Addiction; A Study of the Possible
Convergence of Rational Theory and National Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 725, 757 (1989).
23
Id. Price increases will not incur indefinitely, however, because at some level
higher prices will induce more production.
24
Ian D. Midgley, Just One Question Before We Get to Ohio v. Robinette: “Are You
Carrying any Contraband . . . Weapons, Drugs, Constitutional Protections . . . Anything
Like That?”, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 173, 212 (1997).
25
The traditional linkage between drug use and crime can be accounted for in three
ways. First, as suggested in the text, the higher prices caused by illegality induce many
drug users to commit profitable crimes to pay for the drugs. Second, criminalization of
drug users can force them out of legitimate employment and into criminal employment. See
infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. Third, not mentioned in the text, some persons
who, for whatever reason, are criminally inclined may be just the sort of persons who are
also inclined to use drugs. However, even if the third account is true for some (which it
undoubtedly is), the first and second will be true for others; meaning drug laws are causing
a comparative increase in the number of persons who are criminally inclined—an effect of
drug laws that hardly benefits those drug users so affected.
26
See supra note 25.
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have contemplated criminal conduct to develop into the kind of people who are
willing to commit crimes against others.
Higher prices can also make drug use more hazardous for users.27 Intravenous
injection, for example, is more popular in countries where high drug prices caused
by prohibition drive users to the most “efficient” means of ingesting the drug. In
countries where opiates are legal, the principal methods of consumption are
inhaling the fumes of heated drugs or snorting. 28 Before the Harrison Act of 1914,
“when opiates were cheap and plentiful, they were very rarely injected. Moreover,
injection is rare in those Asian countries where opiates are inexpensive and easily
available.”29 While physical dependence may result from either inhalation or
snorting, neither is as likely as intravenous injections to result in an overdose.30
And consumption by injection can cause other health problems as well. For
example: “Heroin use causes hepatitis only if injected, and causes collapsed veins
and embolisms only if injected intravenously.”31 Finally, the scourge of HIV-AIDS
has been caused, in part, by the sharing of unsterilized needles by drug users. 32
C. Drug Laws Make Drug Users Buy from Criminals
Drug laws attempt to prohibit the use of substances that some people wish to
consume. Thus because the legal sale of drugs is prohibited, people who still wish
to use drugs are forced to do business with the kind of people who are willing to
make and sell drugs in spite of the risk of punishment. Such transactions must
deliberately be conducted away from the police. This puts drug users in great
danger of physical harm in two ways.
First, users are forced to rely upon criminals to regulate the quality and
strength of the drugs they buy. No matter how carefully they measure their
dosages, an unexpectedly potent supply may result in an overdose. And if the drug

27

See KAPLAN, supra note 6, at 128.
See id. (“For instance, in Hong Kong until recently, heroin, though illegal, was
cheap and relatively available, and the drug was inhaled in smoke rather than injected. In
the last few years, however, law enforcement has been able to exert pressure on the supply
of the drug, raising its price considerably and resulting in a significant increase in the use
of injection.”)(footnote omitted).
29
Id.
30
Shane Darke & Wayne Hall, Heroin Overdose: Research and Evidence-Based
Intervention, 80 J. URBAN HEALTH, 189, 195 (2003).
31
JOHN KAPLAN, supra note 6, at 9 (citing Jerome H. Jaffe, Drug Addiction and Drug
Abuse, in GOODMAN AND GILMAN’S: THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS
535, 546 (Alfred Goodman Gilman et al., eds., 6th ed. 1980)). Kaplan argues that
intravenous injection can also increase dependence by producing strong conditioning
effects. See id. at 44 (citing Travis Thompson & Roy Pickens, Drug Self-Administration
and Conditioning, in SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF DRUG DEPENDENCE 177, 177–98 (Hannah
Steinberg, ed., 1969)).
32
Robert W. Stewart, Increase Urged in Government AIDS Effort, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
17, 1987, at 3.
28
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user is suspected to be a police informant, the dosage may deliberately be made
potent by the supplier.
Second, users are likely to be the victims of crime. I would estimate that
approximately half the murder cases I prosecuted as an Assistant States Attorney in
Cook County, Illinois were “drug related” in the sense that the victim was killed
because it was thought he had either drugs or money from the sale of drugs.
Crimes are also committed against persons who seek out criminals from whom to
purchase prohibited drugs. Because drug users and dealers want to avoid the
police, crimes against these groups are unlikely to be reported.33 As a result, these
crimes are likely brought to the attention of the authorities only when a victim’s
body is found.
In 1979, I obtained the confessions that were ultimately used in a prosecution
involving the savage murder of three young men. 34 One of the three had
approached four members of the Latin Kings to purchase marijuana. When his
initial attempt to do business with the gang members was rebuffed, he mistakenly
believed that this was due to a lack of trust—rather than a lack of marijuana, which
was the case. To ingratiate himself with the gang members, he boasted (falsely)
about his gang-affiliated friends and his gang membership. Unfortunately the
persons he named were members of a rival street gang, the Latin Eagles. The gang
members then told him that they could supply marijuana after all and asked the
three to accompany them to an alley. There they were held at gun point and
eventually stabbed to death. These young men were not members of any street
gang. These are drug-law-related deaths. Three young men are dead because drug
laws prevented them from buying marijuana cigarettes as safely as they could buy
tobacco cigarettes. While smoking either kind of cigarette may have been
hazardous to their health, that issue is now moot. Where and how are their deaths
registered in the cost-benefit calculation of drug-law advocates?
D. Drug Laws Induce the Invention of New Intoxicating Drugs
Drug laws make some comparatively benign intoxicating drugs—like
opiates—artificially scarce and thereby create a powerful black market incentive
for clandestine chemists to develop alternative “synthetic” drugs that can be made
more cheaply and with less risk of detection by law enforcement.35 The
hallucinogen, phencyclidine hydrochloride—or “PCP”—is one drug that went
from industrial to recreational usage in by this route.36 Some of these substitute
33

See Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction,
40 VILL. L. REV. 335, 342 (1995).
34
See People v. Caballero, 464 N.E.2d 223, 225 (Ill. 1984) (relating the factual details
of the case).
35
See Marissa A. Miller, History and Epidemiology of Amphetamine Abuse in the
United States, in AMPHETAMINE MISUSE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CURRENT
TRENDS 113–117 (Hilary Klee ed., 1997).
36
Although originally developed by Parke-Davis, “[t]he PCP that is now on the
streets is illegally manufactured. Unfortunately, it is very easy and very inexpensive to
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drugs may turn out to be far more dangerous than the substances they replace, both
to the user and to others.37
E. Drug Laws Criminalize Users
Prohibition automatically makes drug users into “criminals.” While this point
would seem too obvious to merit discussion, the effects of criminalization can be
subtle and hidden. Criminalized drug users may not be able to obtain legitimate
employment. This increases still further the likelihood that the artificially high
prices of illicit drugs will lead drug users to engage in criminal conduct to obtain
income. It is difficult to overestimate the harm caused by forcing drug users into a
life of crime. Once this threshold is crossed, there is often no return. Such a choice
would not be nearly so compelling, nor as necessary, if prohibited substances were
legally available and reasonably priced.
Further, criminalization increases the hold that law enforcement agents have
on drug users. This hold permits law enforcement agents to extort illegal payments
from users or to coerce them into serving as informants who must necessarily
engage in risky activity against others.38 Thus, prohibition both motivates and
enables the police to inflict harm on drug users in ways that would be impossible
in the absence of the legal leverage provided by drug laws.
In all these ways, drug laws harm users of drugs well beyond any harm caused
by drug use itself, and this extra harm is an inescapable consequence of using legal
coercion as means to prevent people from engaging in activity they deem
desirable. While law enforcement efforts typically cause harm to criminals who
victimize others, such effects are far more problematic with laws that seriously
harm the very people for whom these laws are enacted to help. Support for drug
laws in the face of these harms is akin to saying that we have to punish,
criminalize, poison, rob, and murder drug users to save them from the harmful
consequences of using intoxicating drugs.
To avoid these consequences, some have proposed abolishing laws against
personal use of certain drugs, while continuing to ban the manufacture and sale of
these substances.39 However, only the first and last of the five adverse
consequences just discussed result directly from punishing and criminalizing users.
The other three harms to the user result indirectly from punishing those who
make, and you don’t even need a chemistry background.” OAKLEY RAY, DRUGS, SOCIETY,
& HUMAN BEHAVIOR 414 (3d ed. 1983).
37
Because of the “reefer madness” phenomenon that surrounds early reports of the illeffects of drug use, such reports should be heavily discounted until time permits more
objective researchers to do more extensive studies.
38
See, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, LEGALIZE THIS! THE CASE FOR DECRIMINALIZING
DRUGS 149 (2002) (discussing the causal link between drug activity and corruption);
ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES 120 (2001) (describing
police behavior toward informants).
39
See, e.g., KAPLAN, supra note 6, at 189–235 (1983), for such a proposal concerning
heroin.
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manufacture and sell drugs. Decriminalizing the use of drugs would undoubtedly
be an improvement over the status quo, but the remaining restrictions on
manufacturing and sale would continue to cause serious problems for drug users
beyond the problems caused by drug use itself.
As long as coercion is used to reduce drug use, these harms are unavoidable.
They are caused by (1) the use of force to inflict pain on users, thereby directly
harming them; and (2) the dangerous and criminalizing black market in drugs that
results from efforts to stop some from making and selling a product others
genuinely wish to consume. There is nothing that more enlightened law
enforcement personnel or a more efficient administrative apparatus can do to
prevent these effects from occurring. But, as the next section reveals, enlightened
law enforcement personnel or an efficient administrative apparatus are not what
results from employing legal force to prevent adults from engaging in consensual
activity.
IV. THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF DRUG LAWS ON THE GENERAL PUBLIC
The harmful side effects of drug laws are not limited to drug users. This
section highlights the various harms that drug laws inflict on the general public.
There is an old saying in the criminal courts that is particularly apt here: “What
goes around, comes around.” In an effort to inflict pain on drug users, drug laws
inflict considerable costs on nonusers as well.
A. Resources Spent on Drug Law Enforcement
The most obvious cost of drug prohibition is the expenditure of scarce
resources to enforce drug laws—resources that can thus not be used to enforce
other laws or be allocated to other productive activities outside of law
enforcement. Every dollar spent to punish a drug user or seller is a dollar that
cannot be spent collecting restitution from a robber. Every hour spent investigating
a drug user or seller is an hour that could have been used to find a missing child.
Every trial held to prosecute a drug user or seller is court time that could be used to
prosecute a rapist in a case that might otherwise have been plea bargained. These
and countless other expenditures are the “opportunity costs” of drug prohibition.
B. Increased Crime
By artificially raising the price of illicit drugs and thereby forcing drug users
to obtain large sums of money, drug laws create powerful incentives to commit
property and other profitable crimes. And the interaction between drug users and
criminally-inclined drug sellers presents users with many opportunities to become
involved in all types of illegal conduct apart from the drug trade.
Finally, usually neglected in discussions of drugs and crime are the numerous
“drug-related” robberies and murders (sometimes of innocent parties wrongly
thought to have drugs) created by the constant interaction between users and
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criminal sellers.40 Drug dealers and buyers are known to carry significant
quantities of either cash or valuable substances.41 They must deliberately operate
outside the vision of the police. They can rely only on self-help for personal
protection.
Many drug-law users speculate quite freely about the intangible “adverse
effects of drug use on a society.”42 They are strangely silent, however, about how
the fabric of society is affected by the increase in both property crimes and crimes
of violence caused by drug laws.43
C. Harms Resulting from the “Victimless” Character of Drug Use
The most overlooked and well-hidden harms to the general public caused by
drug prohibition may also be the most serious. These are harms that result from
efforts to legally prohibit activity that is “victimless.” It was once commonplace to
call drug consumption victimless, but not anymore. Therefore, before proceeding,
it is very important to explain carefully the very limited concept of “victimless”
crime that will be employed in this section.
To appreciate the hidden costs of drug law enforcement, it is not necessary to
claim that the sale and use of drugs are “victimless” in the moral sense—that is, to
claim that such activity harms only consenting parties and therefore that it violates
no one’s rights and may not justly be prohibited.44 For this limited purpose it is not
necessary to question the contentions that drug users and sellers “harm society” or
that drug use violates “the rights of society.”45
Nevertheless, to understand the hidden costs of drug laws, it is vitally
important to note that drug laws attempt to prohibit conduct that is “victimless” in
a strictly nonmoral or descriptive sense: there is no victim to complain to the police
and to testify at trial.
1. The Incentives Created by Crimes without Victims
When a person is robbed, the crime is usually reported to the police by the
victim. When the robber is caught, the victim is the principal witness in any trial
that might be held. As a practical matter, if the crime is never reported, there will
normally not be a prosecution because the police will never pursue and catch the
40

See THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, DRUGS: DILEMMAS AND CHOICES 93–95

(2000).
41

See Chris Wilkins, Cannabis Transactions and Law Reform, 8 AGENDA 321, 328

(2001).
42

See THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, supra note 40, at 83–94.
See id. at 88–89.
44
I will discuss later the issue of whether drug laws are just. See infra Part V.
45
See, e.g., William F. McDonald, The Role of the Victim in America, in ASSESSING
THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 295 (Randy E.
Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977) (discussing the history of social attitudes toward
crime and asserting that today “[c]rime is regarded as an offense against the state”).
43
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robber. From the perspective of the legal system, it will be as though the robbery
never took place. So too, if the victim refuses to cooperate with the prosecution
after a suspect has been charged, the prosecution of the robber will usually not go
forward.46 What special law enforcement problems result from an attempt to
prosecute crimes in the absence of a “complaining witness” who will assist law
enforcement officials?
To answer this question, let us imagine that robbery—a crime that
undoubtedly has a victim47—was instead a “victimless” crime in this very limited
sense, and that the police set out to catch, and prosecutors to prosecute, all robbers
whose victims refused to report the crime to the police and cooperate with the
prosecution. How would the police detect the fact that a crime had occurred? How
would they go about identifying and proving who did it? How would the case be
prosecuted?
To detect unreported crimes, the police would have to embark on a program
of systematic surveillance. Because they could not simply respond to a robbery
victim’s complaint as they do at present, the police would have to be watching
everywhere and always. Robberies perpetrated in public places—on public streets
or transportation, in public alleys or public parks—might be detected with the aid
of sophisticated surveillance equipment located in these spaces. Those robberies
committed in private places—homes and stores would require even more intrusive
practices.
If the police did detect a robbery, they would be the principal witnesses
against the defendant at trial. It would be their word against that of the alleged
robber. As a practical matter, it would be within their discretion to go forward with
the prosecution or not. There would be no victim pressing them to pursue
prosecution and potentially questioning any decision they might make to drop the
charges or withhold a criminal complaint.
46

See Maria T. Lopez & Carol M. Bast, The Difficulties in Prosecuting Stalking
Cases, 41 NO. 1 CRIM. L. BULLETIN 2 (2009) (discussing a prosecutor’s option “to either
drop the case or continue the case even with a low probability of success” when an
uncooperative victim’s testimony is the only evidence); Marc C. Miller & Ronald F.
Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 146 (2008) (discussing the “proof problem”
presented to prosecutors when victims of alleged crimes refuse to cooperate). To enforce
his decision of noncooperation, the victim always has available the threat of unhelpful
testimony at trial. “I don’t remember if that is the man who robbed me” is all the victim
need say to end the case—and (notwithstanding the theoretical availability of perjury
charges) prosecutors know this.
47
See Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
965, 1038 (2008) (discussing robbery victims). I have chosen robbery as my example
because I wish in this section to separate the issue of who is affected by a crime (who is
and who is not a “victim” in this sense) from the issue of how certain crimes must be
enforced in the absence of a cognizable victim-witness complainant. Robberies
undoubtedly “affect” the persons who are robbed, and other persons as well. But
notwithstanding these effects, if robberies were “victimless” in the sense used in the text—
that is, if there was no victim complaining to the police and testifying at trial—certain
unavoidable enforcement problems would develop.
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We can easily imagine the probable results of such a policy of victimless
robbery enforcement. To the extent that they were doing their job and that money
permitted, the police would be omnipresent. One could not do or say anything in
public without the chance that police agencies would be watching and recording.
The enormous interference with individual liberty that such surveillance would
cause is quite obvious. And putting robbery prosecutions entirely in the hands of
the police would create lucrative new opportunities for corruption in at least two
ways, depending on whether a crime had or had not in fact occurred.
When a crime had occurred, if the effective decision of whether or not to
prosecute is solely in the hands of the police, police officers would be far more
able to overlook a criminal act than they are when a cognizable victim exists. As a
result, the opportunities for extortion of bribes and the incentives for robbery
suspects to offer bribes are both tremendously increased.48 When a crime had not
occurred, the fact that the courts would be accustomed to relying solely on police
testimony in such cases would give the police a greater opportunity to fabricate, or
threaten to fabricate, cases to punish individuals they do not like, to coerce
someone into becoming an informant, or to extort money from those they think
will pay it.
All of the increased opportunity for corruption would result directly from an
attempt to prosecute robberies when robbery victims do not come forward to report
and prosecute the crime themselves. If robbery were victimless in this descriptive
sense, the natural counterweight to these corrupt practices—the potential outrage
of the victim of the robbery and the normal reliance by courts on victim
testimony—would be absent.
Of course we know that this is not how robbery victims normally behave.
Victims do routinely report instances of robbery, creating a case that the police
department must “clear” in some way. And they are usually willing to cooperate
with the prosecution, giving the police far less ability to influence the success of a
given prosecution. Where a victim exists, the problem of corruption is enormously
reduced; this is true even for the crime of murder where, in the absence of the
victim can be a witness, a coroner’s office exists to establish causes of death.
Now suppose that, in addition to not reporting the crime and not testifying at
trial, robbery victims were willing to pay to be robbed; that they actively but
secretly sought out robbers, deliberately meeting them in private places so that the
crime would be perpetrated without attracting the attention of the police; that
billions of dollars in cash were received by robbers in this way.
Such a change in the behavior of robbery victims would dramatically affect
law enforcement efforts. First, as will be discussed in the next section, the secrecy
48

See Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the Weakness of Public
Policy, 103 Yale L.J. 2593, 2597 (1994) (reviewing STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS,
AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS (1990));
Stephanie A. Martz, Note, Legalized Gambling and Public Corruption: Removing the
Incentive to Act Corruptly, or, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks, 13 J. L. & Pol. 453, 463
(1997) (noting police propensity for corruption in victimless crimes).
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engendered by the consensual nature of this transaction would make necessary far
more intrusive kinds of investigative techniques than we at first supposed. Second,
the victims’ willingness to pay robbers to be robbed would make robbery more
lucrative than it would otherwise be and would thus increase the ability of robbers
to bribe the police when they are caught.
Police who are willing to fabricate evidence against someone they knew to be
a robber would expect that such a person would probably be able to afford a
substantial payoff. Of course, corrupt police officers would be risking detection by
honest officers and prosecutors. So we can expect that corrupt officers will attempt
to minimize their risk by entering into a regular prepayment arrangement with
professional robbers to ensure that they would not be arrested when they commit a
robbery. Such an illicit arrangement could be enforced by the corrupt officer’s
credible threat to prosecute a legitimate case or, if necessary, to fabricate a case.
The sale and use of illicit drugs are like victimless robberies, including this
final twist. Drug users not only fail to report violations of the drug laws, they
actively seek out sellers in ways that are designed to avoid police scrutiny. Drug
use is an act deliberately conducted in private. And, because drugs users desire to
consume drugs, they are quite willing to pay for the product.
Because drug use and sale are “victimless” in the purely descriptive sense
employed here, the hypothetical consequences of policing victimless robberies are
the very real results of drug law enforcement. The next three sections will discuss
some of the more serious of these consequences.
2. Drug Laws and Invasion of Privacy.
Because drug use takes place in private and drug users and sellers conspire to
keep their activities away from the prying eyes of the police, law enforcement
surveillance must be extremely intrusive to be effective. The police must somehow
gain access to private areas to watch for this activity.
One way to accomplish this is for a police officer, or more likely an
informant, to pose as a buyer or seller. This means that the police must initiate the
illegal transaction and run the risk that the crime being prosecuted was one that
would not have occurred but for the police instigation.49 And, since possession
alone is also illegal, searches of persons without probable cause might also be
necessary to find contraband.50
Such illegal conduct by police is to be expected when one seeks to prohibit
activity that is deliberately kept away from normal police scrutiny by the efforts of
both parties to the transaction, thereby requiring police intrusion into private areas
if they are to detect these acts.51 It is impossible for police to establish probable
49

See, e.g., HELLMAN, supra note 6, at 60–88; EDWIN M. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT
VICTIMS 136 (1965).
50
See HELLMAN, supra note 6, at 66–70.
51
Id. at 103 (“[A] large proportion of . . . .[marijuana] arrests result from police
conduct that violates the spirit if not the letter of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition

2009]

SIDE EFFECTS OF DRUG PROHIBITION

27

cause for every search for illicit drugs, no matter how small the quantity. Where no
constitutional grounds exist for such an intrusion, a police department and its
officers are forced to decide which is more important: the protection of
constitutional rights or the political consequences of failing to get results.
3. The Weakening of Constitutional Rights
The fact that such privacy-invading conduct by police may be
unconstitutional and therefore illegal does not prevent it from occurring.52 Some of
those who are most concerned about the harm caused by drug laws are lawyers
who have confronted the massive violations of constitutional rights that drug laws
have engendered.53 Such unconstitutional behavior is particularly likely, given our
bizarre approach to policing the police.54
At present we attempt to rectify police misconduct mainly by preventing the
prosecution from using any illegally seized evidence at trial.55 While this would
generally be enough to scuttle a drug law prosecution, it will not prevent the police
from achieving at least some of their objectives. They may be more concerned with
successfully making an arrest and confiscating contraband than they are with
obtaining a conviction.56 This is especially true when they would have neither
confiscation nor conviction without an unconstitutional search.
A policeman who is unwilling to lie about probable cause or to conceal a
prior illegal search may still be inclined to make an arrest for possession
of marijuana, even if he is aware that it will not stand up under judicial
scrutiny. At a minimum he will have confiscated a supply of an illegal
drug. The defendant will be jailed and have to post bail, and in many
cases will have to hire a lawyer; these alone serve as forms of
punishment. Finally, there is always the possibility that the defendant
will plead guilty to a lesser offense rather than risk a felony conviction.57
In most instances, the success of a suppression motion depends on whether
the police tell the truth about their constitutional mistake in their report and at
against unreasonable searches and seizures”); see KAPLAN, supra note 6, at 96 (“Many of
the techniques used to enforce heroin laws do end up violating the constitutional rights of
individuals”).
52
See Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An
Application of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 941–42 (1983).
53
See id. at 975–77.
54
The discussion that immediately follows in the text is only suggestive of a detailed
analysis of this problem and a possible solution I have presented elsewhere. See id. at 937–
85 (noting especially the discussion on victimless crimes spanning pages 980–85).
55
See id. at 941.
56
Comment, Possession of Marijuana in San Mateo County: Some Social Costs of
Criminalization, 22 STAN. L. REV. 101, 114–15 (1969).
57
Id. at 115.
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trial.58 They may not do so if they think that their conduct is illegal.59 “There is
substantial evidence to suggest that police often lie in order to bring their conduct
within the limits of the practices sanctioned by judicial decisions.”60 The only
person who can usually contradict the police version of the incident is the
defendant, and a defendant’s credibility does not generally compare favorably with
that of police officers.61
Those who have committed no crime—who possess no contraband—will
have no effective recourse at all. Because no evidence was seized, there is no
evidence to exclude from a trial.62 As a practical matter, then, the police only have
to worry about unconstitutional searches if something illicit turns up; but if they
can confiscate whatever turns up and make an arrest, they may be better off than if
they respect constitutional rights and do nothing at all.63 Moreover, by encouraging
such frequent constitutional violations, the enforcement of drug laws desensitizes
the police to constitutional safeguards in other areas as well.
The constitutional rights of the general public are therefore threatened in at
least two ways. First, the burden placed on law enforcement officials to enforce
possessory laws without complaining witnesses virtually compels them to engage
in wholesale violations of constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches
and seizures. For every search that produces contraband there are untold scores of
searches that do not. Given our present method of deterring police misconduct by
excluding evidence of guilt, there is little effective recourse against the police
available to those who are innocent of any crime.64
Second, the widespread efforts of police and prosecutors to stretch the outer
boundaries of legal searches can be expected, over time, to contribute to the
eventual loosening up of the rules by the courts. In drug prosecutions, the evidence
being suppressed strongly supports the conclusion that the defendants are guilty.
The more cases that police bring against obviously guilty defendants, the more
opportunities and incentives appellate courts will have to find a small exception
here or there.65 And instead of prosecuting the police for illegal conduct, the
prosecutor’s office becomes an insidious and publicly financed source of political
and legal agitation in the defense of such illegal conduct. As I have said elsewhere,
“the arm of the government whose function is to prosecute illegal conduct is called
upon, in the name of law enforcement, systematically to justify police
irregularities. If these arguments are successful, the definition of illegal conduct

58

See Barnett, supra note 52, at 953.
HELLMAN, supra note 6, at 105.
60
Id.
61
See Barnett, supra note 52, at 960–61.
62
Id.
63
See id.
64
See Barnett, supra note 52, at 962.
65
See id. at 959–66 (discussing the costs imposed on courts that decide to suppress
evidence).
59
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will be altered.” 66 Refusing to consider these long run effects on the stability of
constitutional protections is both dangerous and unrealistic.
One point should be made clear. The police are not the heavies in this tale.
They are only doing what drug-law advocates have asked them to do by the only
means such a task can be done effectively. It is the drug-law advocates who must
bear the responsibility for the grave social problems caused by their favored
policies. By demanding that the police do a job that cannot be done effectively
without violating constitutional rights, drug-law proponents ensure that
constitutional rights will be violated and that the respect of law enforcement
personnel for these rights will be weakened.
4. The Effect of Drug Laws on Corruption
While most people have read about corrupt law enforcement officials who are
supposed to be enforcing drug laws, few people are fully aware how this
corruption is caused by the type of laws being enforced.67 Drug laws allow the
police to use force to prevent voluntary activities.68 Unavoidably, the power to
prohibit also gives the police a de facto power to franchise the manufacture and
sale of drugs, in return for a franchise fee.69
The corruption caused by prohibiting consensual activity is increased still
further by the ease with which law enforcement officers can assist criminals when
there is no complaining witness. As was seen in the discussion of “victimless
robberies,” without a victim to file an official complaint, it is easier for police to
overlook a crime that they might see being committed. When there is no victim to
contradict the police version of events, it is much easier for police to tailor their
testimony to achieve the outcome they desire, for example by describing
circumstances of a bad search that would lead to the evidence beings suppressed
and the charges dropped. When it is the word of the police against the defendant’s,
the defendant usually loses. With no victim pressing for a successful prosecution,
the police, prosecutor, or judge may scuttle a prosecution with little fear of public
exposure.
When compared to a victim crime like robbery, the victimless character of
drug offenses (in the descriptive sense discussed above), and the fact that drug
users are willing to pay for drugs, creates perverse incentives. When robbery is
made illegal, robbers who take anything but cash must sell their booty at a
tremendous discount. In other words, laws against robbery reduce the profit that
sellers of illegally obtained goods receive and thereby discourage both robbery and
the potential for corruption.70
66

Id. at 976.
HELLMAN, supra note 6, at 150.
68
Id. at 6–8.
69
See KAPLAN, supra note 6, at 97–98.
70
Organized burglary and auto theft remain profitable victim crimes, in spite of the
fact that they are legally prohibited, and the profits earned from these crimes are used in
part to pay for the services of corrupt law enforcement officials. Note however that—as
67
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Drug laws have the opposite effect. Drug law enforcement creates an artificial
scarcity of a desired product resulting in sellers receiving a higher price than they
would without such laws. While it is true that drug prohibition makes it more
costly to engage in the activity, this cost is partially or wholly offset by an
increased return in the form of higher prices and by attracting criminal types who
are less risk-averse—that is, individuals who are less likely to discount their
realized cash receipts by their risk of being caught.71 For such persons, the
subjective costs of providing illicit drugs are actually less than they are for more
honest persons.
The extremely lucrative nature of the illicit drug trade makes the increased
corruption of police, prosecutors, and judges all but inevitable. And this corruption
extends far beyond the enforcement of drug laws. Beginning with the prohibition
of alcohol, we have witnessed the creation of a multibillion dollar world-wide
industry to supply various prohibited goods and services.72 The members of this
industry are ruthless profit maximizers whose comparative market advantage is
their ability and willingness to rely on violence and corruption to maintain their
market share and to enforce their agreements.
The prohibition of alcohol and other drugs has created a criminal subculture
that cares little about the distinction between crimes with victims and those
without. To make matters worse, hiding the source of their income from tax and
other authorities encourages these criminals to become heavily involved in legal
businesses so that they may launder their illegally obtained income. They then can
bring to these “legitimate” businesses their brutal tactics, which they use to drive
out honest competitors.
The fact that law enforcement personnel are corrupted by drug laws should be
no more surprising than the fact that many people decide to get high by ingesting
certain chemicals. Among the many tragic ironies of drug prohibition is that by
attempting to prevent the latter, they make the former far more prevalent. Yet
drug-law advocates typically avoid the question of whether the increased systemic

compared with robbery—these crimes typically occur when the victim is not around,
making them effectively “victimless” with respect to having occurrence witnesses
available. And property insurance policies greatly reduce the victim’s enthusiasm to
cooperate in the prosecution, which is another feature of a truly victimless crime.
71
For a discussion of the “time horizons” of criminals that may affect their internal
rate of discount, see Edward C. Banfield, Present-Orientedness and Crime, in ASSESSING
THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 133, 133–42 (1977);
see also Gerold P. O’Driscoll, Jr., Professor Banfield on Time Horizon: What Has He
Taught Us About Crime, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND
THE LEGAL PROCESS 143, 143–62 (1977); Mario J. Rizzo, Time Preference, Situational
Determinism, and Crime, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND
THE LEGAL PROCESS 163, 163–77 (1977).
72
See Morgan Cloud, III, Cocaine, Demand, and Addiction: A Study of the Possible
Convergence of Rational Theory and National Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 725, 727–28
(1989) (stating that the illegal drug industry collects annual revenues of 100 billion dollars
or more).
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corruption that their favored policies unavoidably cause is simply too high a price
to pay for whatever reduction in the numbers of drug users is achieved.
V. THE INJUSTICE OF DRUG LAWS
To this point, my argument has dwelled exclusively on exposing the hidden
costs of drug prohibition—costs that unavoidably result from the fact that drug use
is consensual and victimless. There is, however, a more principled lesson to be
drawn from this discussion of harmful consequences of today’s drug policy:
Policy makers, are inherently much more limited in their ability to construct good
policy than is normally acknowledged. First, policy makers suffer from a pervasive
ignorance of consequences.73 In advance of implementing certain kinds of social
programs, it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict the precise effects they will
have. The foregoing discussion of the hidden costs of drug laws illustrates that it is
often very difficult even to detect and demonstrate the adverse effects of policies
that have already occurred.
Second, the judgment of policy makers and other “experts” is often influenced
by self-interest (as all judgment can be). After staking one’s career on a
commitment to certain kinds of programs, rejecting them becomes difficult when
their consequences are not as expected. Jobs will be lost if programs are seen as
counterproductive or harmful. In rendering opinions, such influences can be hard
to resist.
To minimize decisions made in ignorance or out of self-interest, legal policy
makers must somehow be constrained. And one historically important way to
constrain them is by crafting general principles and rules that are based on a
conception of individual rights that rests on fundamental principles of justice.74
A sound legal system requires a firmer foundation for analyzing questions of
legality than ad hoc arguments about the exigencies of particular policies. It
requires the identification of general principles that reduce the hidden costs of the
sort we have seen results from drug laws without resorting to an endless series of
explicit cost-benefit analyses. It requires principles of general application that can
be defended as basically just and right, despite the fact that circumstances will
arise when adherence to such principles appears to be causing harm, which a
deviation from principle would seem to be able to rectify.
A legal system based on such principles—if such principles can actually be
identified—would not be as vulnerable to the shifting winds of opinion and
prejudice as are particularistic public-policy discussions. I have discussed the vital
social role and the appropriate substance of individual rights at greater length
73

For an excellent summary of the literature that discusses the “knowledge problem”
facing public policy analysts, see DON LAVOIE, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING: WHAT IS
LEFT? 51–92 (1985).
74
This section is based on the analysis of the pervasive social problems of knowledge,
interest, and power in RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE
RULE OF LAW (1998).
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elsewhere and shall not repeat the analysis here.75 The conclusion of such an
analysis when applied to drug laws is that such laws are not only harmful, they are
unjust.
The only practical way of facilitating the pursuit of happiness for each
individual who chooses to live in a social setting is to recognize the rights of
individuals to control their external possessions and their bodies—traditionally
known as property rights—free from the forcible interference of any other person.
If the pursuit of happiness is the Good for each person, then property rights are the
prerequisites for pursuing that Good while living in close proximity to others. And
the social prerequisites of the Good are the tenets of justice that all must live by.
To deny these rights is to act unjustly.
The inalienable rights of individuals to live their own lives and to control their
own bodies are, according to this analysis, essential to human survival and
fulfillment in a social setting. Drug laws undermine this control by seeking to
subject the bodies of some persons to the forcible control of other persons. Such
laws seek forcibly to prevent persons from using their bodies in ways that they
desire and that do not interfere with the equal liberty of others.
A proper rights analysis would avoid wasteful, and often irreversible, social
experimentation. Two factors were seen above to generate the hidden costs of drug
laws: the use of forcible means to achieve the end of controlling consensual
conduct. These are the very factors that together identify drug laws as violations
of individual rights and unjust interferences with individual liberty.
Just as you do not need to try PCP to know it is, on balance, bad for you, a
proper rights analysis can reveal that we do not have to try drug laws to know they
are socially harmful. This illustrates why a system of rights is ultimately preferable
to a system of ad hoc public policy determinations. Had we adhered to a system of
properly crafted individual rights, we would have avoided these serious harms in
the first place.
John Stuart Mill once provided a defense of the distinction between matters of
justice or rights that are properly subject to legal enforcement and matters of
morality or vice that are not: “Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules,
which concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore
of more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life. . . .” 76
And “the essence of the idea of justice,” is “that of a right residing in the
individual. . . .” 77 As Mill then concluded, “[t]he moral rules which forbid
mankind to hurt one another (in which we must never forget to include wrongful
interference with each other’s freedom), are more vital to human well-being than
any maxims, however important, that only point out the best mode of managing

75

See id.
JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 55 (Ernest Rhys ed., E.P. Dutton & Co 1920) (1910).
77
Id.
76

2009]

SIDE EFFECTS OF DRUG PROHIBITION

33

some department of human affairs.”78 The proposition that the law should not
attempt to regulate all vices is, of course, much older than Mill.79
A rights analysis does it deny that drug use can adversely “affect” the lives of
others. Many kinds of conduct from quitting school to having sex with strangers—
can adversely affect the lives of those close to the persons who engage in such
activity. But this does not justify collapsing the distinction between acts that
adversely affect another and acts that violate another’s rights.
Herbert Spencer considered the objection that there is no “essential difference
between right conduct toward others and right conduct toward self, [because] . . .
what are generally considered purely private actions, do eventually affect others to
such a degree, as to render them public actions; as witness the collateral effects of
drunkenness or suicide.”80 In this allegation, he conceded “there is much truth; and
it is not to be denied that under a final analysis, all such distinctions as those above
made must disappear.”81 Nevertheless, the difficulty of drawing such a line is
characteristic of all classifications. “The same finite power of comprehension
which compels us to deal with natural phenomena by separating them into groups
and studying each group by itself,” he replied, “may also compel us to separate
those actions which place a man in direct relationship with his fellows, from others
which do not so place him; although it may be true that such a separation cannot be
strictly maintained.”82
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Legal institutions are not capable of correcting every ill in the world. On this
point most would agree. Serious harm results when legal means are employed to
correct harms that are not amenable to legal regulation. The harmful side-effects of
drug laws represent a case in point. A properly formulated analysis of individual
rights provides a way of distinguishing harms that are properly subject to legal
prohibition from those that are not.
VI. CONCLUSION
An addiction to drug laws is caused by an inadequate understanding of
individual rights and the vital role such rights play in deciding matters of legality.
As a result, policies are implemented that cause serious harm to the very
individuals whom these policies were devised to help and to the general public.
If the rights of individuals to choose how to use their person and possessions
are fully respected, there is no guaranty that people will exercise their rights
wisely. Some may mistakenly choose the path of finding happiness in a bottle or in
a vial. Others may wish to help these people by persuading them of their folly and
supporting them when they seek to wean themselves from their dependency.
We must not, however, give in to the powerful temptation to grant some the
power to impose their consumptive preferences on others by force. This power—
the essence of drug laws—is not only addictive once tasted, it also carries with it
one of the few guaranties in life: the guaranty of untold corruption and human
misery.

